Optimal collusion-proof auctions
Optimal collusion-proof auctions
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.004
复制
发表时间：
2009-03-01
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Kim, Jinwoo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Che, Yeon-Koo;Kim, Jinwoo
我们研究了一个最优防合谋拍卖的环境中，投标人的子集可能，串通不仅对他们的出价，但也对他们的参与。尽管他们有能力共谋参与，但潜在共谋者面临的信息不对称可以被显著利用，以削弱他们的共谋力量。第二好的拍卖-即，无串通环境中的最优拍卖--如果至少有一个投标人不串通，或者存在多个投标卡特尔，或者次优结果涉及物品不被出售的非平凡概率，则可以使其防串通。无论如何，最优防串通拍卖规定了对串通投标人的非平凡排除，即，拒绝出售给任何有积极可能性的串通投标人。(C)2008年由Elsevier Inc.出版
We study an optimal collusion-proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may, collude not just on their bids but also on their participation. Despite their ability to collude on participation, informational asymmetry facing the potential colluders can be exploited significantly to weaken their collusive power. The second-best auction - i.e., the optimal auction in a collusion-free, environment - can be made collusion-proof, if at least one bidder is not collusive, or there are multiple bidding cartels, or the second-best outcome involves a non-trivial probability of the object not being sold. Regardless, optimal collusion-proof auction prescribes non-trivial exclusion of collusive bidders, i.e., a refusal to sell to any collusive bidder with positive probability. (C) 2008 Published by Elsevier Inc.