Prudential capital controls or bailouts? The impact of different collateral constraint assumptions
Prudential capital controls or bailouts? The impact of different collateral constraint assumptions
复制标题
审慎的资本管制还是救助？
DOI：
10.1007/s00199-016-0975-2
复制
发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Ryo Kato and Takayuki Tsuruga
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mitsuru Katagiri;Ryo Kato and Takayuki Tsuruga
有关附带约束的小型开放经济模型的文献为宏观审慎监管提供了理论基础。本文考察了危机期间作为一种救助形式的债务补贴与审慎资本管制的比较。我们发现，在家庭附带约束的时间假设下，救助的政策处方有很大不同。如果借贷受到家庭在借贷前购买的资产价值的限制，那么救助是中性的，这表明审慎的资本管制是可取的。另一方面，如果家庭在借款的同时抵押他们购买的资产，救助计划将复制不受限制的配置，没有抵押品限制，表现优于审慎的资本管制。然而，即使在后一种情况下，我们的数字实验表明，就其规模和频率而言，这种恢复不受约束的分配的纾困可能无法实施。
The literature on small open-economy models with collateral constraints has provided the theoretical grounds for macroprudential regulations. This paper examines a subsidy on debt during a crisis as a form of bailout in comparison with prudential capital controls. We show that the policy prescription on bailouts differs substantially between the timing assumptions of the collateral constraint of households. If borrowing is constrained by the value of assets that households have purchased before they borrow, the bailout is neutral, suggesting that prudential capital controls are preferable. If, on the other hand, households collateralize their assets that they purchase at the same time as their borrowing, the bailout replicates the unconstrained allocation without collateral constraint and outperforms prudential capital controls. Even in the latter case, however, our numerical experiments suggest that such bailouts restoring the unconstrained allocation may not be implementable in terms of its size and frequency.