COOPERATION IN AN ASYMMETRIC VOLUNTEERS DILEMMA GAME - THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL-EVIDENCE
COOPERATION IN AN ASYMMETRIC VOLUNTEERS DILEMMA GAME - THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL-EVIDENCE
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DOI：
10.1007/bf01245571
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发表时间：
1993-01-01
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
DIEKMANN, A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
DIEKMANN, A
对称志愿者困境博弈（VOD）模拟了N个行动者中的每一个都面临着要么产生一个步骤级集体利益（行动“C”）要么搭便车（“D”）的决定。一个参与者的合作行为足以产生集体利益。单边合作对D-参与者产生收益U，对合作参与者产生收益U-K。然而，如果所有参与者都决定“搭便车”，每个参与者的收益都是零（U>K>0）。在这篇文章中，讨论了一个重要的修改。在非对称VOD中，参与者对集体商品的兴趣和/或生产成本（即U或K）可能会有所不同。广义非对称视频点播类似于市场进入游戏。关于受试者行为的替代假设来自博弈论分析。他们在实验环境中进行了调查。混合纳什均衡概念的应用产生了一个相当反直觉的预测，这显然与经验数据相矛盾。Harsanyi-Selten理论和谢林的“焦点理论”的预测与数据更符合。然而，他们没有考虑到在不对称VOD游戏的背景下也可观察到的“责任扩散效应”。
The symmetric Volunteer's dilemma game (VOD) models a situation in which each of N actors faces the decision of either producing a step-level collective good (action ''C'') or freeriding (''D''). One player's cooperative action suffices for producing the collective good. Unilateral cooperation yields a payoff U for D-players and U-K for the cooperative player(s). However, if all actors decide for ''freeriding'', each player's payoff is zero (U>K>0). In this article, an essential modification is discussed. In an asymmetric VOD, the interest in the collective good and/or the production costs (i.e. U or K) may vary between actors. The generalized asymmetric VOD is similar to market entry games. Alternative hypotheses about the behaviour of subjects are derived from a game-theoretical analysis. They are investigated in an experimental setting. The application of the mixed Nash-equilibrium concept yields a rather counter-intuitive prediction which apparently contradicts the empirical data. The predictions of the Harsanyi-Selten-theory and Schelling's ''focal point theory'' are in better accordance with the data. However, they do not account for the ''diffusion-of-responsibility-effect'' also observable in the context of an asymmetric VOD game.