Changing State Behaviour: Damages before the European Court of Human Rights
Changing State Behaviour: Damages before the European Court of Human Rights
复制标题
改变国家行为：欧洲人权法院的损害赔偿
DOI：
10.1093/ejil/chy064
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
Fikfak V
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fikfak V
尽管通过对《欧洲人权公约》制度的许多改革作出了努力，但不遵守欧洲人权法院的判决仍然是欧洲理事会面临的一个主要问题。本文探讨我们如何改变国家行为，以及损害赔偿在这种情况下可能发挥什么作用。首先，本文着重于如何选择补救措施影响遵守和为什么加重或惩罚性赔偿看起来像一个理想的选择，以推动国家遵守。我探讨了学者和法官最近的论点，他们认为欧洲人权法院应该积极改变其方法（或者可能已经改变了），以推动国家行为走向遵守和防止未来的侵权行为。基于我的实证研究，我表明，目前的判例法提出了几个障碍，引进这种损害赔偿。基于对法律的经济分析和行为科学的见解，我揭示了法院的方法如何不符合激励国家改变行为所需的任何要素。最后，我质疑在一个依赖于自愿遵守的制度中，加重或惩罚性赔偿在多大程度上是有效的。
Regardless of the efforts undertaken through the many reforms of the European Convention on Human Rights system, non-compliance with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) remains a major problem for the Council of Europe. This article asks how we can change state behaviour and what role, if any, could damages play in this context. First, the article focuses on how the choice of remedy affects compliance and why aggravated or punitive damages look like an ideal option to nudge states into compliance. I explore recent arguments by scholars and judges who argue that the ECtHR should actively shift its approach (or perhaps already has) to nudge state behaviour towards compliance and prevention of future violations. Based on my empirical research, I show that the current case law presents several obstacles to the introduction of such damages. Building on the economic analysis of the law and insights from behavioural sciences, I reveal how the Court’s approach fails to comply with any of the elements needed to incentivize states to change their behaviour. I finally question to what extent aggravated or punitive damages can be efficient within a system that relies on voluntary compliance.