The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-1981 and the End of the Cold War
The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-1981 and the End of the Cold War
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1980-1981 年苏联未入侵波兰及冷战结束
DOI：
10.1080/09668139999001
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发表时间：
1999
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
V. Mastny
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
V. Mastny
1980年至1981年的波兰危机，由反共的“团结”运动的出现所引发，是苏联对东欧的控制在该地区的共产主义政权之前最后一次受到挑战，最终苏联国家本身在10年后崩溃。然而，与前几次类似的战争--1953年的德国、1956年的匈牙利、1968年的捷克斯洛伐克--不同的是，克里姆林宫没有诉诸军事力量来避免其重大安全利益受到的威胁。相反，在沃伊切赫·雅鲁泽尔斯基将军领导下的波兰军队独自完成了这一任务，从而防止了对欧洲既定东西方秩序的彻底破坏。从更长远的角度来看，在了解冷战如何结束的基础上，波兰实施戒严令是否阻止了苏联入侵的更大悲剧这一特定问题与更大的问题有关，即莫斯科是否愿意默许其帝国的初期解体，即使它拥有足够的军事力量来阻止或至少减缓这一进程。这种行为是如此不同寻常，与传统现实主义关于国家必须捍卫其权力利益的智慧相矛盾，以至于如果不考虑之前的经验，就无法正确理解这种行为。新获得的档案证据和以前闻所未闻的几个关键参与者的证词，现在允许波兰危机作为苏联政策最后阶段的形成经验进行仔细研究。“事后看来，一个不容回避的问题是，莫斯科是否在1980-81年就已经准备好放弃对波兰的控制，也许还有东欧其他国家，因为正是这个国家在八年后推动了该地区共产党统治的垮台。或者，在没有使用外部力量的情况下暂时遏制波兰的动荡，是否为随后苏联这个超级大国的非暴力灭亡提供了必要的酝酿？无论如何，莫斯科在1980- 1981年的任何时候都认真考虑过对波兰进行军事干预吗？如果是的话，为什么没有发生？无论答案是什么，它们不仅反映了苏联军事力量在其扩张顶峰时期的效用，而且反映了在冷战末期形成的安全环境中，为追求政治目标而使用军事力量的一般限制。在这种独特的环境中，人们的看法和误解是如何影响苏联的决策的？克里姆林宫领导人是否对
TIE POLISH CRISIS OF 1980-1981, precipitated by the emergence of the anti-communist 'Solidarity' movement, was the last time the Soviet control of Eastern Europe was challenged before the communist regimes in the area and eventually the Soviet state itself collapsed 10 years later. Yet, unlike on previous such occasions-East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968-the Kremlin abstained from resorting to military force to avert the presumed threat to its vital security interests. Instead the Polish military under General Wojciech Jaruzelski performed this task by itself, thus preventing a radical disruption of the established East-West order in Europe. In the longer perspective, informed by the knowledge of how the Cold War ended, the particular question of whether the imposition of martial law in Poland prevented the greater tragedy of a Soviet invasion relates to the larger question of Moscow's willingness to acquiesce in the incipient dissolution of its empire even while possessing abundant military power to prevent or at least slow down the process. So extraordinary was this behaviour, belying the conventional realist wisdom about states' imperative to defend their power interests, that it cannot be properly understood without taking into account the experience that had preceded it. Newly available archival evidence and previously unheard testimonies by several of the key participants now allow the Polish crisis to be closely examined as a formative experience for the final phase of Soviet policy.' With the benefit of hindsight, the irresistible question is whether in 1980-81 Moscow may already have been prepared to give up its control of Poland and perhaps the rest of Eastern Europe with it, for this was the country that eight years later would give the push that brought down communist rule in the region. Or did the temporary containment of the Polish upheaval without the use of outside force allow the necessary gestation of the subsequent non-violent demise of the Soviet superpower? In any case, did Moscow seriously contemplate a military intervention in Poland at any time in 1980-81, and if so, why did it not take place? Whatever the answers, they reflect not only on the utility of Soviet military power, then at the peak of its expansion, but also on the constraints on the use of military power in general for pursuing political goals in the security environment shaped by the Cold War at its terminal stage. In that unique environment, how did perceptions and misperceptions influence Soviet decisions? Were Kremlin leaders responsive to