Unemployment Insurance and Disability Insurance in the Great Recession.
Unemployment Insurance and Disability Insurance in the Great Recession.
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大衰退中的失业保险和残疾保险。
DOI：
10.1086/683140
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
vonWachter,TillM
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mueller,AndreasI;Rothstein,Jesse;vonWachter,TillM
社会保障残疾保险（SSDI）在经济衰退期间增加。如果边缘申请人能够工作，但无法找到工作，反周期失业保险福利延长可能会减少SSDI的吸收。利用大衰退中的UI扩展作为变化的来源，我们没有发现任何迹象表明UI好处的到期会导致SSDI应用程序，并且可以排除有意义的影响。一项补充分析发现，这两个项目的受援人口之间几乎没有重叠：只有28%的SSDI获奖者在上一个日历年有任何劳动力依恋，其中只有4%的人接受了UI。
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) awards rise during recessions. If marginal applicants are able to work but unable to find jobs, countercyclical Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefit extensions may reduce SSDI uptake. Exploiting UI extensions in the Great Recession as a source of variation, we find no indication that expiration of UI benefits causes SSDI applications and can rule out effects of meaningful magnitude. A supplementary analysis finds little overlap between the two programs’ recipient populations: only 28% of SSDI awardees had any labor force attachment in the prior calendar year, and of those, only 4% received UI.