Speculative Hyperinflations in Maximizing Models: Can We Rule Them Out?
Speculative Hyperinflations in Maximizing Models: Can We Rule Them Out?
复制标题
最大化模型中的投机性恶性通货膨胀：我们可以排除它们吗？
DOI：
10.1086/261171
复制
发表时间：
1981
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Kenneth Rogoff
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Obstfeld;Kenneth Rogoff
本文利用基于个人最大化行为的无限时域模型，研究了与货币增长无关的价格水平爆炸路径--投机性恶性通货膨胀--在理性预期下能否成为均衡路径。在纯粹的法定货币制度下，只有通过严格限制个人偏好才能排除投机性恶性通货膨胀;但当政府通过保证货币的最低真实的赎回价值来部分支持货币时，投机性恶性通货膨胀是不可能的，即使代理人不完全确定他们可以在任何给定时期赎回他们的货币。分析还证实，内爆的价格水平路径和资本资产价格的分歧路径下的任何一种货币制度都不是均衡。
This paper uses an infinite-horizon model based on individual maximizing behavior to study whether explosive price-level paths unrelated to monetary growth--speculative hyperinflations--can be equilibrium paths under rational expectations. In a pure fiat money regime, speculative hyperinflations can be excluded only through severe restrictions on individual preferences; but when the government fractionally backs the currency by guaranteeing a minimal real redemption value for money, speculative hyperinflations are impossible, even if agents are not completely certain that they can redeem their money in any given period. The analysis also confirms that implosive price-level paths and divergent paths for capital asset prices are not equilibria under either monetary regime.