Search platforms: showrooming and price parity clauses

Search platforms: showrooming and price parity clauses
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DOI:
10.1111/1756-2171.12305
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发表时间:
2020-03
期刊:
The RAND Journal of Economics
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Chengsi Wang;Julian Wright
Chengsi Wang;Julian Wright
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Chengsi Wang;Julian Wright

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我们提供了一种模式,消费者可以直接或通过平台搜索公司。平台降低了搜索成本,但却向公司收取交易费用。平台费增加了“展厅现象”的可能性,即消费者在一个平台上搜索,然后转而直接购买,以利用更低的直接价格。在这种情况下,像Booking.com这样的搜索平台采用了价格平价条款,要求公司在平台上提供最优惠的价格,并辩称这是防止“展厅”现象的必要条件。然而,尽管在我们的模型中允许展厅,我们发现价格平价条款经常伤害消费者。
We provide a model in which consumers search for firms directly or through platforms. Platforms lower search costs but charge firms for the transactions they facilitate. Platform fees raise the possibility of showrooming, in which consumers search on a platform but then switch and buy directly to take advantage of lower direct prices. In settings like this, search platforms like Booking.com have adopted price parity clauses, requiring firms to offer their best prices on the platform, arguing this is needed to prevent showrooming. However, despite allowing for showrooming in our model, we find that price parity clauses often harm consumers.