In Defense of Usury Laws
In Defense of Usury Laws
复制标题
捍卫高利贷法
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Meza
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Coco;D. Meza
本文认为，如果道德风险导致信贷配给，适当的高利贷法必须提高社会福利。在市场清算制度下，如果资金供应缺乏弹性，高利贷法总是有利的。当引入创业异质性时，即使在资金供应具有弹性的情况下，也会出现改善。这些结果也适用于代价高昂的国家验证模型和信贷市场的转移模型。最后，事实证明，当一些企业家表现出过度乐观时，高利贷法律在消除低收益项目方面是有用的。
This paper shows that if moral hazard leads to credit rationing, an appropriate usury law must raise social welfare. Under market clearing, a usury law is always beneficial if funds are inelastically supplied. When entrepreneurial heterogeneity is introduced, an improvement arises even when the supply of funds is elastic. These results apply also in costly state-verification models and diversionary models of the credit market. Finally, a usury law proves useful in eliminating low-yielding projects when some entrepreneurs display excess optimism.