Subsidies, Hierarchy and Peers: The Awkward Economics of Higher Education

Subsidies, Hierarchy and Peers: The Awkward Economics of Higher Education
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补贴、等级制度和同侪:高等教育的尴尬经济学

DOI:
10.1257/jep.13.1.13
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发表时间:
1999
影响因子:
8.4
通讯作者:
Gordon C. Winston
Gordon C. Winston
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Gordon C. Winston

文献摘要

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高等教育是一个市场不明确的行业,平均价格不到生产成本的三分之一,由此产生的学生补贴由不同学校提供的金额相差悬殊,形成了一个等级森严的市场。对生产重要的投入只能从公司自己的客户那里购买。本文使用非营利组织的增强理论和 1995 年国家数据描述了由此产生的成本、价格、补贴和等级结构,以显示其规模并提出其通常具有重大意义的影响。公众的直觉以及企业、行业和福利的经济模型常常会产生扭曲的理解和可疑的公共政策。
Higher education is an industry where markets don't clear, prices on average cover less than a third of production costs, the resulting student subsidies are given in strikingly different amounts by different schools, creating a sharply hierarchical market. And an input important to production can be bought only from the firm's own customers. This paper describes the resulting structure of costs, prices, subsidies, and hierarchy using an augmented theory of nonprofits and 1995 national data to show their magnitudes and suggest their often significant implications. Public intuition and economic models of firms, industries, and welfare often yield distorted understanding and dubious public policies.