The Emergence of Explicit Knowledge in a Serial Reaction Time Task: The Role of Experienced Fluency and Strength of Representation.

The Emergence of Explicit Knowledge in a Serial Reaction Time Task: The Role of Experienced Fluency and Strength of Representation.
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DOI:
10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00502
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发表时间:
2017
影响因子:
3.8
通讯作者:
Haider H
Haider H
中科院分区:
心理学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Esser S;Haider H

文献摘要

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序列反应时任务(SRTT)是研究无意识学习过程特性的重要范式。一个特别有趣但仍有争议的话题是,在什么条件下,无意识获得的知识变成有意识的知识。关于潜在机制的不同假设可以对比性地分为两种:一种是通过训练过程中关联权重的加强逐渐将内隐知识转化为显性知识的单一系统观点,另一种是内隐知识本身没有意识到的双重系统观点。相反,它需要第二个过程来检测性能的变化,并能够获得有意识的知识。在一系列的三个实验中,我们操纵了序贯试验和偏离试验的安排。在SRTT训练中,参与者要么接受小区块的顺序试验,然后接受小区块的偏离试验(每个试验22次),要么接受随机混合的顺序试验和偏离试验。重要的是,在这两种情况下,正确和异常转换的数量是相同的。实验1表明,两种条件都获得了相当数量的内隐知识,这些内隐知识在不同的测试任务中表现出来。实验2进一步证明,两种条件在主观感受到的任务流畅性上有所不同,使用迷你积木训练时体验到的流畅度更高。最后,实验3显示,用较长的顺序和异常材料的小块训练的参与者发展了更明确的知识。讨论了它们与关于内隐学习情境中显性知识出现的不同假设的兼容性,特别是关于元认知判断的作用,更具体地说,是关于意外事件假设。
The Serial Reaction Time Task (SRTT) is an important paradigm to study the properties of unconscious learning processes. One specifically interesting and still controversially discussed topic are the conditions under which unconsciously acquired knowledge becomes conscious knowledge. The different assumptions about the underlying mechanisms can contrastively be separated into two accounts: single system views in which the strengthening of associative weights throughout training gradually turns implicit knowledge into explicit knowledge, and dual system views in which implicit knowledge itself does not become conscious. Rather, it requires a second process which detects changes in performance and is able to acquire conscious knowledge. In a series of three experiments, we manipulated the arrangement of sequential and deviant trials. In an SRTT training, participants either received mini-blocks of sequential trials followed by mini-blocks of deviant trials (22 trials each) or they received sequential and deviant trials mixed randomly. Importantly the number of correct and deviant transitions was the same for both conditions. Experiment 1 showed that both conditions acquired a comparable amount of implicit knowledge, expressed in different test tasks. Experiment 2 further demonstrated that both conditions differed in their subjectively experienced fluency of the task, with more fluency experienced when trained with mini-blocks. Lastly, Experiment 3 revealed that the participants trained with longer mini-blocks of sequential and deviant material developed more explicit knowledge. Results are discussed regarding their compatibility with different assumptions about the emergence of explicit knowledge in an implicit learning situation, especially with respect to the role of metacognitive judgements and more specifically the Unexpected-Event Hypothesis.