What Chance-Credence Norms Should Not Be
What Chance-Credence Norms Should Not Be
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机会-信任规范不应该是什么
DOI：
10.1111/nous.12047
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Pettigrew R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Pettigrew R
机会-信任准则规定了代理人在涉及客观机会的命题中的信用应该如何与她在其他命题中的信用相关联。最著名的这种规范是大卫·刘易斯提出的主要原则(PP)。然而，刘易斯注意到，当与许多试图将偶然性事实简化为非情态事实的偶然性描述结合在一起时，PP过于强大。那些支持这种机率描述的人提出了两种可供选择的机率信任准则：第一种是霍尔和陶氏的新原理(NP)；第二种是伊斯梅尔的一般配方(IP)。因此，问题出现了：我们应该采用NP还是IP，还是两者都采用？在这篇文章中，我认为，知识产权与简约主义相结合会产生不可接受的后果，因此我们必须只接受NP。
A chance‐credence norm states how an agent's credences in propositions concerning objective chances ought to relate to her credences in other propositions. The most famous such norm is the Principal Principle (PP), due to David Lewis. However, Lewis noticed that PP is too strong when combined with many accounts of chance that attempt to reduce chance facts to non‐modal facts. Those who defend such accounts of chance have offered two alternative chance‐credence norms: the first is Hall's and Thau's New Principle (NP); the second is Ismael's General Recipe (IP). Thus, the question arises: Should we adopt NP or IP or both? In this paper, I argue that IP has unacceptable consequences when coupled with reductionism, so we must accept NP alone.