Bidder's strategy under group-buying auction on the Internet
Bidder's strategy under group-buying auction on the Internet
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DOI：
10.1109/tsmca.2002.807029
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发表时间：
2002-11
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Jing Chen;Xilong Chen;Xiping Song
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jing Chen;Xilong Chen;Xiping Song
团购拍卖是一种新型的互联网动态定价机制。它是卖方价格双重拍卖的一种变体，它使竞买者通过互联网作为一个整体获得批量折扣，即竞买者越多，拍卖标的的价格就越低。本文在应用独立私有价值（IPV）模型、投标人风险中性、对称等假设下对团购拍卖进行分析，并构建不完全信息动态博弈模型来说明投标人的投标过程。证明对于投标人来说，存在一种弱占优策略S，即无论投标人何时到达拍卖场，无论其投标历史如何，不大于其对标的物价值的最高允许投标价格始终是其最优投标价格，但可能不是唯一的。
The group-buying auction is a new kind of dynamic pricing mechanism on the Internet. It is a variant of the sellers' price double auction, which makes the bidders as a group through Internet to get the volume discounts, i.e., the more bidders bid, the lower the price of the object being auctioned becomes. In this paper, we analyze the group-buying auction under some assumptions, such as that the independent private values (IPVs) model applies and bidders are risk neutral and symmetric, etc., and build an incomplete information dynamic game model to illustrate the bidders' bidding process. It proves that for the bidders there exists a weakly dominant strategy S, i.e., no matter when a bidder arrives at the auction and what the bidding history is, the highest permitted bid price that is no greater than his value to the object is always his optimal bid price but may not be the unique one.