Boolean Circuit Camouflage: Cryptographic Models, Limitations, Provable Results and a Random Oracle Realization
Boolean Circuit Camouflage: Cryptographic Models, Limitations, Provable Results and a Random Oracle Realization
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布尔电路伪装：密码模型、局限性、可证明的结果和随机预言实现
DOI：
10.1145/3139324.3139331
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Memon, Nasir
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Di Crescenzo, Giovanni;Rajendran, Jeyavijayan;Karri, Ramesh;Memon, Nasir
最近的硬件进步，称为门电路老化，已经打开了保护集成电路免受逆向工程攻击的可能性。在本文中，我们研究的可能性，可证明地提高一个单一的布尔门到一个更大的布尔电路的物理存储的能力。我们首先提出严格的定义，借用现代密码学和程序混淆领域的方法，电路伪装。非正式地说，门伪装被定义为一个物理门的变换，它似乎掩盖了攻击者评估包含这个门的电路的门。在这个假设下，我们正式证明了两个结果：一个限制和一个建设。我们的极限结果表明，对于某些电路，无论我们对多少个门进行了验证，能够评估电路的对手都将正确地猜测出所有验证的门。我们的构造结果表明，如果伪随机函数存在（密码学中的一个常见假设），少量的伪随机门就足以：（a）不向评估伪随机函数电路的对手泄漏关于伪随机门的额外信息;（B）将这些函数变成随机预言机。后面的这些结果是关于电路伪装在密码模型中可证明的第一个结果（以前，构造是在没有正式模型的情况下给出的，最终被逆向工程，或者在特定类别的攻击下被认为是安全的）。我们的研究结果意味着aconcrete和可证明的实现随机预言机，即使在基于硬件的假设下，是适用于许多情况下，包括公钥基础设施。寻找随机预言机的可证明实现的特殊条件多年来一直是一个开放的问题，因为随机预言机的软件可证明实现被证明是（几乎肯定）不可能的。
Recent hardware advances, calledgate camouflaging, have opened the possibility of protecting integrated circuits against reverse-engineering attacks. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of provably boosting the capability of physical camouflaging of a single Boolean gate into physical camouflaging of a larger Boolean circuit. We first propose rigorous definitions, borrowing approaches from modern cryptography and program obfuscation areas, for circuit camouflage. Informally speaking, gate camouflaging is defined as a transformation of a physical gate that appears to mask the gate to an attacker evaluating the circuit containing this gate. Under this assumption, we formally prove two results: a limitation and a construction. Our limitation result says that there are circuits for which, no matter how many gates we camouflaged, an adversary capable of evaluating the circuit will correctly guess all the camouflaged gates. Our construction result says that if pseudo-random functions exist (a common assumptions in cryptography), a small number of camouflaged gates suffices to: (a) leak no additional information about the camouflaged gates to an adversary evaluating the pseudo-random function circuit; and (b) turn these functions into random oracles. These latter results are thefirstresults on circuit camouflagingprovable in a cryptographic model(previously, construction were given under no formal model, and were eventually reverse-engineered, or were argued secure under specific classes of attacks). Our results imply aconcrete and provable realization of random oracles, which, even if under a hardware-based assumption, is applicable in many scenarios, including public-key infrastructures. Finding special conditions under which provable realizations of random oracles has been an open problem for many years, since a software only provable implementation of random oracles was proved to be (almost certainly) impossible.
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DOI：
10.1109/hpcsim.2016.7568371
发表时间：
2016-07
期刊：
2016 International Conference on High Performance Computing & Simulation (HPCS)
影响因子：
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作者：
G. D. Crescenzo;L. Bahler;B. Coan;Y. Polyakov;Kurt Rohloff;David Cousins
通讯作者：
G. D. Crescenzo;L. Bahler;B. Coan;Y. Polyakov;Kurt Rohloff;David Cousins
DOI：
10.1109/hpcs.2017.115
发表时间：
2017-07
期刊：
2017 International Conference on High Performance Computing & Simulation (HPCS)
影响因子：
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作者：
L. Bahler;G. D. Crescenzo;Y. Polyakov;Kurt Rohloff;David Cousins
通讯作者：
L. Bahler;G. D. Crescenzo;Y. Polyakov;Kurt Rohloff;David Cousins
DOI：
10.1016/b978-0-12-408089-8.00001-x
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
Adv. Comput.
影响因子：
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作者：
Neil Walkinshaw
通讯作者：
Neil Walkinshaw
使用阈值电压控制的数字 IP 保护
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2016
期刊：
IEEE International Symposium on Quality Electronic Design
影响因子：
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作者：
Joseph Davis;Niranjan S. Kulkarni;Jinghua Yang;A. Dengi;S. Vrudhula
通讯作者：
S. Vrudhula