Discrete clock auctions: an experimental study
Discrete clock auctions: an experimental study
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离散时钟拍卖：实验研究
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
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通讯作者：
Pacharasut Sujarittanonta
中科院分区：
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作者：
P. Cramton;Emel Filiz;Erkut Y. Ozbay;Pacharasut Sujarittanonta
我们分析了离散时钟拍卖中不同定价规则的影响。两种最常见的定价规则是最高拒绝出价 (HRB) 和最低接受出价 (LAB)。在 HRB 下，获胜者支付出清市场的最低价格；在 LAB 下，获胜者支付出清市场的最高价格。理论上，HRB 和 LAB 拍卖都可以最大化收入，并且在我们的环境中都是完全有效的。我们的实验结果表明，LAB 拍卖获得了更高的收入。这一收入结果可以解释 LAB 定价的频繁使用。另一方面，HRB 在理论上和实验上都成功地得出了投标人的真实价值。
We analyze the implications of different pricing rules in discrete clock auctions. The two most common pricing rules are highest-rejected bid (HRB) and lowest-accepted bid (LAB). Under HRB, the winners pay the lowest price that clears the market; under LAB, the winners pay the highest price that clears the market. In theory, both the HRB and LAB auctions maximize revenues and are fully efficient in our setting. Our experimental results indicate that the LAB auction achieves higher revenues. This revenue result may explain the frequent use of LAB pricing. On the other hand, HRB is successful in eliciting true values of the bidders both theoretically and experimentally.