Output-Based Allocation of Environmental Policy Revenues and Imperfect Competition
Output-Based Allocation of Environmental Policy Revenues and Imperfect Competition
复制标题
环境政策收入的产出分配与不完全竞争
DOI：
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
C. Fischer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Fischer
基于产出的收入返还的环境政策有效地将排放税与产出补贴结合起来。存在三种类似的形式：可交易的绩效标准、带有回扣的排放税以及基于产出的分配的可交易许可证。纳入产出补贴的两个论点是：不完全竞争，仅环境监管就可能加剧产出不足；以及不完全参与，对一小部分污染者实施监管可能导致产出转向豁免企业。然而，这两种情况都意味着计划参与者之间的产出份额可能很大。在这种情况下，产出分配许可证提供的补贴少于固定回扣，并且可能导致参与者之间的生产转移效率低下。退还排放税会降低减排的动力，而且如果成本不同，边际减排成本也不会相等。无论排放率是在两阶段模型中同时确定还是战略性确定，这些结果都适用于古诺双头垄断模型。
Environmental policies with output-based refunding of the revenues effectively combine a tax on emissions with a subsidy to output. Three similar forms exist: tradable performance standards, an emissions tax with rebates, and tradable permits with output-based allocation. Two arguments for including an output subsidy are imperfect competition, in which an environmental regulation alone could exacerbate output underprovision, and imperfect participation, in which imposing a regulation on a subset of polluters could cause output to shift to exempt firms. However, both these scenarios imply that output shares among program participants are likely to be significant. In this situation, output-allocated permits offer less of a subsidy than a fixed rebate, and they can lead to inefficient shifting of production among participants. Rebating the emission tax reduces the incentive to abate, nor will marginal abatement costs be equalized if costs differ. These results hold in a Cournot duopoly model whether emission rates are determined simultaneously or strategically in a two-stage model.