Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing
Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing
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DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.008
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发表时间：
2021-12-08
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Weintraub, Gabriel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bergemann, Dirk;Castro, Francisco;Weintraub, Gabriel
我们比较了最优三度价格歧视政策与统一定价政策的利润。统一的定价政策为市场的所有部分提供相同的价格。我们的主要结果建立了一个广泛的一类三度价格歧视问题凹利润函数（在价格空间）和共同的支持，一个统一的价格保证实现一半的最优垄断利润。这一利润界限适用于卖方在三级价格歧视下可能使用的任何数量的细分市场和价格。我们建立，这些条件是紧的，削弱共同支持或共同支持可以导致任意差的利润比较，即使是定期或单调的风险率分布。(C)2021爱思唯尔公司All rights reserved.
We compare the profit of the optimal third-degree price discrimination policy against a uniform pricing policy. A uniform pricing policy offers the same price to all segments of the market. Our main result establishes that for a broad class of third-degree price discrimination problems with concave profit functions (in the price space) and common support, a uniform price is guaranteed to achieve one half of the optimal monopoly profits. This profit bound holds for any number of segments and prices that the seller might use under third-degree price discrimination. We establish that these conditions are tight and that weakening either common support or concavity can lead to arbitrarily poor profit comparisons even for regular or monotone hazard rate distributions. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.