Short‐Term Versus Long‐Term Coalitions in the Policy Process: Automotive Pollution Control, 1963–1989
Short‐Term Versus Long‐Term Coalitions in the Policy Process: Automotive Pollution Control, 1963–1989
复制标题
政策过程中的短期与长期联盟：汽车污染控制，1963-1989
DOI：
10.1111/j.0190-292x.2004.00054.x
复制
发表时间：
2004
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
P. Sabatier
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Zafonte;P. Sabatier
对政策过程中联盟的研究发现了短期和长期联盟的证据。造成不同结果的两个可能的方法论原因是：（1）很少有关于该主题的系统纵向研究；（2）大多数学者没有区分基本利益和次要利益受到威胁的情况。本文首先应用倡导联盟框架（ACF）来解决这两点，该框架区分基本信念/利益和次要信念/利益，然后对 26 年来各组织关于汽车污染控制的证词内容进行定量分析。与 ACF 一致，我们发现，尽管发生了两个潜在的破坏性事件——1973-74 年的石油禁运和 1980 年的选举，但随着时间的推移，利益集团、立法者、地方政府和机构的联盟相对稳定。另一方面，ACF 的假设（即更广泛的信念比更狭窄的次要信念更稳定）几乎没有支持。我们的系统方法还使我们能够将稳定性的一般模式与不稳定的有趣例外情况区分开来。
Research on coalitions in the policy process has found evidence of both short-term and long-term coalitions. Two possible methodological reasons for the varied results are that (1) there has been little systematic longitudinal research on the topic, and (2) most scholars have not distinguished situations where fundamental versus secondary interests are at stake. This article addresses both points by first applying the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), which distinguishes fundamental from secondary beliefs/interests, and then performing a quantitative analysis of the content of organizations’ testimonies regarding automotive pollution control over 26 years. Consistent with the ACF, we find that coalitions of interest groups, legislators, local governments, and agencies are relatively stable over time, despite two potentially disruptive events—the 1973–74 Oil Embargo and the 1980 Elections. On the other hand, there is little support for the ACF's hypothesis that broader beliefs will be more stable than narrower secondary beliefs. Our systematic methodology also enables us to separate the general pattern of stability from interesting exceptions of instability.