Lying and Deception in Games
Lying and Deception in Games
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DOI：
10.1086/704754
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发表时间：
2020-03-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Sobel, Joel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sobel, Joel
这篇文章提出了在战略环境中说谎、欺骗和损害的定义。谎言依赖于信息的可接受意义的存在，但不需要受众如何回应信息的模型。欺骗确实需要一个受众如何解释信息的模型，但不直接涉及后果。损害需要考虑信息的后果。谎言不一定具有欺骗性。欺骗不需要说谎。说谎和欺骗与平衡是相容的。我给出了一些条件，在这些条件下欺骗一定是有害的。
This article proposes definitions of lying, deception, and damage in strategic settings. Lying depends on the existence of accepted meanings for messages but does not require a model of how the audience responds to messages. Deception does require a model of how the audience interprets messages but does not directly refer to consequences. Damage requires consideration of the consequences of messages. Lies need not be deceptive. Deception does not require lying. Lying and deception are compatible with equilibrium. I give conditions under which deception must be damaging.