Interplay between cost and effectiveness in influenza vaccine uptake: a vaccination game approach
Interplay between cost and effectiveness in influenza vaccine uptake: a vaccination game approach
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DOI：
10.1098/rspa.2019.0608
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发表时间：
2019-12-24
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
Tanimoto, Jun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Arefin, Md. Rajib;Masaki, Tanaka;Tanimoto, Jun
预防注射被认为是控制流感爆发的最有效措施之一。主要有两种类型的流感病毒-甲型流感和B流感，有几个亚型-通常发现在人类之间传播。传统的三价（TIV）流感疫苗针对两种甲型流感病毒株和一种B流感病毒株。四价（QIV）疫苗针对一种额外的B病毒株，确保更好地预防流感;然而，QIV疫苗的使用可能昂贵，因此给社会带来额外的经济负担。这种情况可能会造成在个人层面选择疫苗类型的困境。本文试图通过疫苗接种游戏的框架来解释这样一个困境，在这个游戏中，个人可以选择三个选项之一：选择QIV或TIV疫苗或不接种。我们的方法假设了一个无限混合种群中疫苗接种博弈的平均场框架，将流感的疾病传播过程与流行季节之前发生的两种疫苗接种决策过程的协同进化纠缠在一起。我们进行了一系列的数值模拟，试图说明不同的情况。该框架已通过所谓的多智能体仿真（MAS）方法进行了验证。
Pre-emptive vaccination is regarded as one of the most protective measures to control influenza outbreak. There are mainly two types of influenza viruses-influenza A and B with several subtypes-that are commonly found to circulate among humans. The traditional trivalent (TIV) flu vaccine targets two strains of influenza A and one strain of influenza B. The quadrivalent (QIV) vaccine targets one extra B virus strain that ensures better protection against influenza; however, the use of QIV vaccine can be costly, hence impose an extra financial burden to society. This scenario might create a dilemma in choosing vaccine types at the individual level. This article endeavours to explain such a dilemma through the framework of a vaccination game, where individuals can opt for one of the three options: choose either of QIV or TIV vaccine or none. Our approach presumes a mean-field framework of a vaccination game in an infinite and well-mixed population, entangling the disease spreading process of influenza with the coevolution of two types of vaccination decision-making processes taking place before an epidemic season. We conduct a series of numerical simulations as an attempt to illustrate different scenarios. The framework has been validated by the so-called multi-agent simulation (MAS) approach.