Rational Secret Sharing, Revisited
Rational Secret Sharing, Revisited
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DOI：
10.1007/11832072_16
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发表时间：
2006-09
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. D. Gordon;Jonathan Katz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. D. Gordon;Jonathan Katz
我们考虑了非理性参与者的秘密共享问题。这个问题是由Halpern和蒂格（STOC 2004）提出的，他们声称对于n =2不可能有解，但对于情况n ≥3有解。与他们的主张相反，我们给出了一个理性秘密共享协议，该协议扩展到casen≥3，比Halpern-Teague解决方案更简单，并且还提供了许多其他优点。我们还展示了如何避免经销商的持续参与，无论是在我们自己的协议或Halpern和蒂格。我们的技术扩展到合理的球员试图安全地计算一个任意函数的情况下，在一定的假设下，球员的效用。
We consider the problem of secret sharing amongnrational players. This problem was introduced by Halpern and Teague (STOC 2004), who claim that a solution isimpossibleforn=2 but show a solution for the casen≥3. Contrary to their claim, we show a protocol for rational secret sharing amongn=2 players; our protocol extends to the casen≥3, where it is simpler than the Halpern-Teague solution and also offers a number of other advantages. We also show how to avoid the continual involvement of the dealer, in either our own protocol or that of Halpern and Teague.Our techniques extend to the case of rational players trying to securely compute an arbitrary function, under certain assumptions on the utilities of the players.