MOBILE TERMINATION, NETWORK EXTERNALITIES AND CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS
MOBILE TERMINATION, NETWORK EXTERNALITIES AND CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS
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DOI：
10.1111/ecoj.12097
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发表时间：
2014-09-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.2
通讯作者：
Lopez, Angel L.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hurkens, Sjaak;Lopez, Angel L.
我们重新审视有关存在网络外部性的移动终端的文献。当公司区分网内通话和网外通话或者订阅需求富有弹性时，就会出现外部性。该文献预测，当终止费用增加时，利润会减少，消费者剩余会增加。这令人费解，因为实际上监管机构正在降低终止率，而网络运营商却反对这样做。当消费者的期望被假设为被动但需要在均衡中得到满足时（如卡茨和夏皮罗（1985）所定义的），而不是像迄今为止所假设的那样对非均衡价格做出反应，这个难题就得到了解决。
We re-examine the literature on mobile termination in the presence of network externalities. Externalities arise when firms discriminate between on and off-net calls or when subscription demand is elastic. This literature predicts that profit decreases and consumer surplus increases when termination charges increase. This is puzzling as in reality regulators are pushing termination rates down while being opposed to do so by network operators. This puzzle is resolved when consumers' expectations are assumed passive but required to be fulfilled in equilibrium, as defined by Katz and Shapiro (1985), instead of being responsive to non-equilibrium prices, as assumed until now.