Optimal commodity taxation for reduction of envy
Optimal commodity taxation for reduction of envy
复制标题
减少嫉妒的最佳商品税收
DOI：
10.1007/s00355-003-0216-z
复制
发表时间：
2003
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Y. Nishimura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Y. Nishimura
本文在λ-公平性的基础上推导了两级经济中的最优商品税。一个分配是λ-公平的，如果没有代理人羡慕任何其他代理人的捆绑的比例λ。研究了一类λ-公平分配中Pareto非支配分配的性质.我们首先表明，嫉妒减少和增强低技能代理人的效用之间的一致性取决于1）休闲的收入弹性2）偏好和技能差异的程度。关于最优税收规则，我们可以证明以下几点。在其他条件不变的情况下，当嫉妒约束具有约束力时，低技能代理人偏好的、具有高希克斯弹性的商品被征收更重的税。最优商品税是均匀的，如果除了弱可分性，次效用的商品是相似的。
This paper derives optimal commodity taxes in a two-class economy based on λ-equitability. An allocation is λ-equitable if no agent envies a proportion λ of the bundle of any other agent. We examine the properties of Pareto undominated allocations in a class of λ-equitable allocations. We first show that the consistency between envy reduction and enhancement of the low-skilled agent’s utility depends on 1) the income elasticity of leisure 2) the degree of preference and skill differences. On the optimal tax rule, we can show the following. When the envy constraint is binding,ceteris paribus, the goods preferred by the low skilled agent and of high Hicksian elasticities are taxed more heavily. The optimal commodity tax is uniform if, in addition to weak separability, sub-utility of the goods is homothetic.