Securing the Containerized Supply Chain: Analysis of Government Incentives for Private Investment
Securing the Containerized Supply Chain: Analysis of Government Incentives for Private Investment
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.1090.1105
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发表时间：
2010-02
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Nitin Bakshi;Noah Gans
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Nitin Bakshi;Noah Gans
为了减轻恐怖分子通过海运集装箱向美国走私大规模毁灭性武器的威胁，美国海关和边境保护局在集装箱进入国内港口时进行检查。检查驱动的拥堵成本高昂，CBP为公司提供激励措施，以改善供应链上游的安全，从而减轻美国港口的检查负担。我们进行了经济分析，这个激励计划，称为海关贸易反恐合作伙伴关系（C-TPAT），建模在一个博弈论的框架CBP，贸易公司和恐怖分子之间的战略互动。我们的均衡结果强调了一个适当的运行程序可以有效地转移一些CBP的安全负担，私营企业的可能性。这些结果也表明，CBP可能有机会使用战略延迟作为企业加入的激励。比较静态分析表明，随着能力的增加，贸易伙伴关系委员会的成员数量有系统地减少。
To mitigate the threat that terrorists smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States through maritime containers, the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspects containers upon entry to domestic ports. Inspection-driven congestion is costly, and CBP provides incentives to firms to improve security upstream in the supply chain, thereby reducing the inspection burden at U.S. ports. We perform an economic analysis of this incentive program, called Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), modeling in a game-theoretic framework the strategic interaction between CBP, trading firms, and terrorists. Our equilibrium results highlight the possibility that a properly run program can efficiently shift some of CBP's security burden to private industry. These results also suggest that CBP may have the opportunity to use strategic delay as an incentive for firms to join. Analysis of comparative statics shows that, with increasing capacity, membership in C-TPAT systematically declines.