Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities
Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities
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赤裸裸的排斥：具有外部性的合同的实验研究
DOI：
10.1257/aer.99.5.1850
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
K. Spier
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Claudia M. Landeo;K. Spier
本文报告了一项实验的结果，该实验旨在评估现有卖方通过排他性合同取消市场赎回权并获利的能力。我们使用 Rasmusen、Ramseyer 和 Wiley（1991）以及 Segal 和 Whinston（2000）描述的战略环境，其中当足够多的下游买家与现有企业签订独家合同时，进入是无利可图的。当歧视不可能出现时，该游戏就类似于猎鹿（协调）游戏，其中买方的收益由现任卖方内生选择。当购买者未能就他们偏好的均衡进行协调时，就会出现排斥。买方之间的双向非约束性赛前沟通降低了排他性合同的效力，并促使卖方提供更慷慨的合同条款。当歧视和沟通成为可能时，排斥率就会上升。当买家可以相互沟通时，分而治之的策略会更常见。当购买者的收益是内生选择的而不是外生给予的时，排除率明显更高。最后，秘密要约被证明可以降低现有企业排除利润的能力。
This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts. We use the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) where entry is unprofitable when sufficiently many downstream buyers sign exclusive contracts with the incumbent. When discrimination is impossible, the game resembles a stag-hunt (coordination) game in which the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen by the incumbent seller. Exclusion occurs when the buyers fail to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium. Two-way non-binding pre-play communication among the buyers lowers the power of exclusive contracts and induces more generous contract terms from the seller. When discrimination and communication are possible, the exclusion rate rises. Divide-and-conquer strategies are observed more frequently when buyers can communicate with each other. Exclusion rates are significantly higher when the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen rather than exogenously given. Finally, secret offers are shown to decrease the incumbent's power to profitably exclude.