The FOMC Versus the Staff: Where Can Monetary Policymakers Add Value?
The FOMC Versus the Staff: Where Can Monetary Policymakers Add Value?
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FOMC 与员工：货币政策制定者可以在哪里增加价值？
DOI：
10.1257/aer.98.2.230
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Romer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Christina D. Romer;D. Romer
货币政策制定者是应该将工作人员对政策行动效果的预测视为已知，还是应该尝试纳入更多信息？本文试图通过检验联邦公开市场委员会自己的预测的有用性来阐明这个问题。联邦公开市场委员会每年两次对主要宏观经济变量进行预测。联邦公开市场委员会成员在编制预测时可以查阅工作人员的预测。我们发现，在预测通胀和失业率时，FOMC和工作人员预测的最佳组合使FOMC预测的权重基本上为零，而工作人员预测的权重基本上为1：FOMC似乎没有增加预测的价值。预测实际增长的结果就不那么明确了。我们还发现了统计和叙事证据，表明FOMC和工作人员的预测之间的差异有助于预测货币政策冲击，这表明政策制定者的行动在一定程度上是基于他们明显被误导的信息。
Should monetary policymakers take the staff forecast of the effects of policy actions as given, or should they attempt to include additional information? This paper seeks to shed light on this question by testing the usefulness of the FOMC's own forecasts. Twice a year, the FOMC makes forecasts of major macroeconomic variables. FOMC members have access to the staff forecasts when they prepare their forecasts. We find that the optimal combination of the FOMC and staff forecasts in predicting inflation and unemployment puts a weight of essentially zero on the FOMC forecast and essentially one on the staff forecast: the FOMC appears to have no value added in forecasting. The results for predicting real growth are less clear-cut. We also find statistical and narrative evidence that differences between the FOMC and staff forecasts help predict monetary policy shocks, suggesting that policymakers act in part on the basis of their apparently misguided information.