Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools
Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools
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发表时间：
1999
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通讯作者：
X. Vives
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作者：
X. Vives
“寡头垄断问题”--当市场只有几个竞争者时价格如何形成的问题--是经济思想史上比较持久的问题之一。在这本书中，泽维尔·维夫斯运用现代博弈论方法发展了寡头垄断定价理论。Vives首先将该领域的经典贡献--包括古诺、伯特兰、埃奇沃斯、张伯林和罗宾逊的贡献--与现代博弈论联系起来。在他对基本博弈论工具和均衡的讨论中，他特别关注超模博弈论的最新发展。这本书的中间部分，对经典静态模型的深入处理，提供了专门的存在结果，均衡的特征，对大市场的扩展，以及从应用工作的角度对比较静力学的分析。最后一章使用各种工具研究承诺问题、进入、信息传递和共谋：两阶段博弈、不对称信息下的竞争建模和机制设计理论，以及重复和动态博弈理论，包括马尔可夫完美均衡和微分博弈。
The "oligopoly problem"--the question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors--is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. Vives begins by relating classic contributions to the field--including those of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, Chamberlin, and Robinson--to modern game theory. In his discussion of basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, he pays particular attention to recent developments in the theory of supermodular games. The middle section of the book, an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides specialized existence results, characterizations of equilibria, extensions to large markets, and an analysis of comparative statics with a view toward applied work. The final chapters examine commitment issues, entry, information transmission, and collusion using a variety of tools: two-stage games, the modeling of competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games, including Markov perfect equilibrium and differential games.