Quantum hacking: Experimental demonstration of time-shift attack against practical quantum-key-distribution systems
Quantum hacking: Experimental demonstration of time-shift attack against practical quantum-key-distribution systems
复制标题
DOI：
10.1103/physreva.78.042333
复制
发表时间：
2008-10-01
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Lo, Hoi-Kwong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zhao, Yi;Fung, Chi-Hang Fred;Lo, Hoi-Kwong
量子密钥分发（QKD）系统可以通过超过100公里的标准光纤发送量子信号，并且被广泛认为是安全的。在这里，我们实验表明，技术上可行的攻击，即时移攻击，对商业QKD系统。我们的研究结果表明，与流行的看法相反，窃听者，夏娃，有一个不可忽略的概率（类似于4%），以打破系统的安全性。Eve的成功是由于在贝尔不等式的实验测试中众所周知的检测效率漏洞。因此，检测效率漏洞不仅在基础物理中起着关键作用，而且在QKD系统等技术应用中也起着关键作用。
Quantum-key-distribution (QKD) systems can send quantum signals over more than 100 km standard optical fiber and are widely believed to be secure. Here, we show experimentally a technologically feasible attack-namely, the time-shift attack-against a commercial QKD system. Our result shows that, contrary to popular belief, an eavesdropper, Eve, has a non-negligible probability (similar to 4%) to break the security of the system. Eve's success is due to the well-known detection efficiency loophole in the experimental testing of Bell's inequalities. Therefore, the detection efficiency loophole plays a key role not only in fundamental physics, but also in technological applications such as QKD systems.