A General Equilibrium Model for Industries with Price and Service Competition
A General Equilibrium Model for Industries with Price and Service Competition
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DOI：
10.1287/opre.1040.0149
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发表时间：
2004-11
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Fernando Bernstein;A. Federgruen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Fernando Bernstein;A. Federgruen
本文建立了寡头垄断企业的随机一般均衡库存模型，其中所有库存约束参数都是内生确定的。我们提出了几种需求过程系统，其分布是所有零售商价格和所有零售商服务水平的函数。我们继续研究在需求不确定的情况下，面对这种广义竞争的行业的无限水平模型的均衡行为。我们系统地考虑了以下三个竞争场景。(1)仅限于价格竞争：这里，我们假设企业的服务水平是外生选择的，但描述了价格和库存策略均衡如何随着所选择的服务水平的变化而变化。(2)同时的价格和服务水平竞争：在这里，每个企业同时选择一个服务水平和一个价格和库存组合策略。(3)两阶段竞争：企业按顺序进行竞争选择。在第一阶段，所有公司同时选择服务水平；在第二阶段，公司在充分了解所有竞争者选择的服务水平的情况下，同时选择定价和库存策略。我们证明了在上述所有设置下，无限水平固定策略的纳什均衡是存在的，并且它具有简单的结构，只要在所谓的简化博弈中存在纳什均衡，我们特别关注企业是否可以仅根据自己的(投入)特征(即其成本参数和需求函数)来选择其服务水平的问题。我们还考察了在同时竞争下，企业在哪种需求模型下对不同竞争者外在指定特征的变化做出反应：(I)向同一方向调整其服务水平和价格，从而通过提供更好(较差)的服务来补偿价格上涨(降低)，或(Ii)向相反方向调整它们，从而同时提供更好或更差的价格和服务。
This paper develops a stochastic general equilibrium inventory model for an oligopoly, in which all inventory constraint parameters are endogenously determined. We propose several systems of demand processes whose distributions are functions of all retailers' prices and all retailers' service levels. We proceed with the investigation of the equilibrium behavior of infinite-horizon models for industries facing this type of generalized competition, under demand uncertainty.We systematically consider the following three competition scenarios. (1) Price competition only: Here, we assume that the firms' service levels are exogenously chosen, but characterize how the price and inventory strategy equilibrium vary with the chosen service levels. (2) Simultaneous price and service-level competition: Here, each of the firms simultaneously chooses a service level and a combined price and inventory strategy. (3) Two-stage competition: The firms make their competitive choices sequentially. In a first stage, all firms simultaneously choose a service level; in a second stage, the firms simultaneously choose a combined pricing and inventory strategy with full knowledge of the service levels selected by all competitors. We show that in all of the above settings a Nash equilibrium of infinite-horizon stationary strategies exists and that it is of a simple structure, provided a Nash equilibrium exists in a so-called reduced game.We pay particular attention to the question of whether a firm can choose its service level on the basis of its own (input) characteristics (i.e., its cost parameters and demand function) only. We also investigate under which of the demand models a firm, under simultaneous competition, responds to a change in the exogenously specified characteristics of the various competitors by either: (i) adjusting its service level and price in the same direction, thereby compensating for price increases (decreases) by offering improved (inferior) service, or (ii) adjusting them in opposite directions, thereby simultaneously offering better or worse prices and service.