The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation
The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation
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社区监管的可信度危机
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
G. Majone
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Majone
欧盟法规的公信力危机以反复出现的食品恐慌为标志，更因德国和法国政府拒绝遵守欧盟委员会解除英国牛肉出口禁令的决定等官方反应而凸显。然而，这场危机并非新出现的，也不限于食品安全领域。欧共体/欧盟监管公信力问题出现在不同层面。一些问题源于创始条约的深层结构，而其他问题则源于一体化进程的路径依赖、制度惰性或对短期利益的追求。本文主要关注第二类问题，但对更根本问题进行简短讨论似乎是有益的，可借此提醒人们注意零碎的制度设计所能取得的成果是有限的。本文探讨了对公信力的两种具体威胁：欧盟高度复杂且差异化的监管任务与可用行政手段之间的不匹配；以及欧盟委员会日益政治化和议会化所导致的可信承诺问题。文章认为，这两类问题的解决方案可能在于将权力更广泛地委托给嵌入国家监管机构和国际组织跨国网络的独立欧洲机构。制度设计和程序控制领域的最新理论进展表明，可以使这些网络满足辅助性、问责制和效率的所有合理要求。
The credibility crisis of Community regulation is symbolized by the recurrent food scares, and even more by official reactions such as the refusal of the German and French governments to abide by the decision of the Commission to lift the ban on exports of British beef. However, the crisis is not new, nor is it limited to food safety. Problems of regulatory credibility in the EC/EU arise at different levels. Some are rooted in the deep structure of the founding treaties, while other problems result from path-dependent aspects of the integration process, from institutional inertia, or from the pursuit of short-term advantages. This article is primarily concerned with the second group of problems, but a short discussion of the more fundamental issues seems useful as a reminder of the limits of what can be achieved by piecemeal institutional engineering. The article addresses two specific threats to credibility: the mismatch between the Community’s highly complex and differentiated regulatory tasks and the available administrative instruments; and the problem of credible commitment caused by the increasing level of politicization and parliamentarization of the Commission. The solution to both sets of problems, it is argued, may be found in a more far-reaching delegation of powers to independent European agencies embedded in transnational networks of national regulators and international organizations. Recent theoretical advances in the area of institutional design and procedural controls suggest that such networks could be made to satisfy all reasonable requirements of subsidiarity, accountability and efficiency.