How Probabilistic Risk Assessment Can Mislead Terrorism Risk Analysts
How Probabilistic Risk Assessment Can Mislead Terrorism Risk Analysts
复制标题
DOI：
10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01492.x
复制
发表时间：
2011-02-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Cox, Louis Anthony (Tony), Jr.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Brown, Gerald G.;Cox, Louis Anthony (Tony), Jr.
传统的概率风险评估（PRA），最初为工程系统开发的类型，仍然被提出用于恐怖主义风险分析。我们表明，这样的PRA应用程序是不合理的一般。恐怖分子的能力，寻求和使用信息，并积极研究不同的攻击选项，然后再决定做什么，提出了独特的功能，恐怖主义风险评估，没有充分解决的传统PRA的自然和工程系统，部分原因是基于这样的PRA估计的决定不充分对冲不同的概率，攻击者可能最终采取行动。这些概率可能与防御者的概率不同（即使防御者的专家是经过彻底训练的、校准良好的、无偏见的概率评估者），因为它们可能以不同的信息为条件。我们说明PRA和恐怖主义风险分析之间的根本区别，并建议使用强大的决策分析的风险管理时，攻击者可能知道更多的一些攻击选项比我们做的。
Traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), of the type originally developed for engineered systems, is still proposed for terrorism risk analysis. We show that such PRA applications are unjustified in general. The capacity of terrorists to seek and use information and to actively research different attack options before deciding what to do raises unique features of terrorism risk assessment that are not adequately addressed by conventional PRA for natural and engineered systems-in part because decisions based on such PRA estimates do not adequately hedge against the different probabilities that attackers may eventually act upon. These probabilities may differ from the defender's (even if the defender's experts are thoroughly trained, well calibrated, unbiased probability assessors) because they may be conditioned on different information. We illustrate the fundamental differences between PRA and terrorism risk analysis, and suggest use of robust decision analysis for risk management when attackers may know more about some attack options than we do.