Optimal Redistributive Taxation

Optimal Redistributive Taxation
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最优税收再分配

DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198753414.001.0001
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发表时间:
2016
期刊:
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影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Matti Tuomala
Matti Tuomala
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
Matti Tuomala

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税收制度筹集了大量的收入,用于资助公共部门的活动,税收/转移政策以及公共提供的教育、保健和社会服务,在治疗贫穷的症状和根源方面发挥着关键作用。规范分析对于税收/转移支付设计至关重要,因为它可以分别评估政府再分配标准的变化以及对税收和转移支付的行为反应规模的变化如何影响最佳税收/转移支付制度。最优税收理论提供了一种严格思考这些权衡的方法。主要为研究生和研究人员写的,这卷打算作为教科书和研究专著,连接最优税收理论到税收政策。它评论了Mirrlees评论的一些政策建议,并建立在作者在公共经济学,最优税收理论,行为公共经济学和收入不平等方面的工作基础上。这本书深入解释了Mirrlees模型,并提出了它的各种扩展。第一组扩展考虑改变消费和工作的偏好:行为经济修改(如位置外部性,前景理论,家长作风,短视行为和习惯形成),但也异质的工作偏好(除了收入能力的差异)。第二组修改涉及政府的目标。这本书解释了最优再分配税收制度的差异,当政府-而不是最大化社会福利-最大限度地减少贫困或最大化社会福利的基础上排名秩序或慈善保守主义社会福利函数。第三组扩展考虑扩展Mirrlees所得税框架,以允许差别商品税,资本所得税,公共产品提供,私人产品的公共提供,以及产生外部性的商品征税。第四组扩展考虑纳入一些重要的真实字扩展,如标记某些纳税人群体的纳税时间表。在所有扩展中,本书使用高级数值模拟说明了主要机制。
Tax systems raise large amounts of revenue for funding public sector's activities, and tax/transfer policy, together with public provision of education, health care, and social services, play a crucial role in treating the symptoms and the causes of poverty. The normative analysis is crucial for tax/transfer design because it makes it possible to assess separately how changes in the redistributive criterion of the government, and changes in the size of the behavioural responses to taxes and transfers, affect the optimal tax/transfer system. Optimal tax theory provides a way of thinking rigorously about these trade-offs. Written primarily for graduate students and researchers, this volume is intended as a textbook and research monograph, connecting optimal tax theory to tax policy. It comments on some policy recommendations of the Mirrlees Review, and builds on the authors work on public economics, optimal tax theory, behavioural public economics, and income inequality. The book explains in depth the Mirrlees model and presents various extensions of it. The first set of extensions considers changing the preferences for consumption and work: behavioural-economic modifications (such as positional externalities, prospect theory, paternalism, myopic behaviour and habit formation) but also heterogeneous work preferences (besides differences in earnings ability). The second set of modifications concerns the objective of the government. The book explains the differences in optimal redistributive tax systems when governments - instead of maximising social welfare - minimise poverty or maximise social welfare based on rank order or charitable conservatism social welfare functions. The third set of extensions considers extending the Mirrlees income tax framework to allow for differential commodity taxes, capital income taxation, public goods provision, public provision of private goods, and taxation commodities that generate externalities. The fourth set of extensions considers incorporating a number of important real-word extensions such as tagging of tax schedules to certain groups of tax payers. In all extensions, the book illustrates the main mechanisms using advanced numerical simulations.