Personhood and human embryos and fetuses.
Personhood and human embryos and fetuses.
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人格和人类胚胎和胎儿。
DOI：
10.1093/jmp/10.3.253
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发表时间：
1985
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
C. Tauer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Tauer
关于胚胎和胎儿的公共政策决定往往缺乏关于其道德地位的合理论证。虽然关于人格的协议是难以捉摸的，但这一概念无疑具有道德意义。这个术语的一个规定用法，即“人”的心理意义，适用于早期人类的产前生活，包括人格的道德相关方面。心理意义上的“人”具有最低限度的心理学，定义为通过记忆的生理类似物保留经验的能力，这些经验可能是无意识的;以及成为完整意义上的人的潜力。心理人格值得归属于道德人格，因为心理意义上的“人”的经验与完整的人的经验具有连续性;这种经验开始决定个人心理特征的发展。精神人格是涉及人类胚胎和胎儿的侵入性研究的合理辩护边界。由于缺乏精确的经验知识，政策制定者可以在最早的脑干活动时，也就是在胎儿发育的第七周，将精神人格归因于脑干活动。
Public policy decisions concerning embryos and fetuses tend to lack reasoned argument on their moral status. While agreement on personhood is elusive, this concept has unquestioned moral relevance. A stipulated usage of the term, the psychic sense of 'person', applies to early human prenatal life and encompasses morally relevant aspects of personhood. A 'person' in the psychic sense has a minimal psychology, defined as the capacity to retain experiences, which may be nonconscious, through physiological analogs of memory; and the potential to become a person in the full sense. Psychic personhood merits attribution of moral personhood because the experience of a 'person' in the psychic sense has continuity with the experience of a full person; and this experience begins to determine the development of the personal psychological characteristics of that individual. Psychic personhood is a rationally defensible boundary for invasive research involving human embryos and fetuses. Lacking precise empirical knowledge, policy makers could attribute psychic personhood at the time of earliest brainstem activity, that is, during the seventh week of fetal development.