Presidentialized Parties
Presidentialized Parties
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总统政党
DOI：
10.1177/0010414002035004004
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发表时间：
2002
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
David J. Samuels
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
David J. Samuels
学者们对政党进行了大量的研究，但比较主义者还没有探讨总统制和民主制如何不同地影响政党的发展、组织和行为。政党文献是从欧洲议会制度的探索中发展起来的，在欧洲议会制度中，宪法结构不是一个独立的变量，或者从美国的案例中发展起来的，在美国总统制有时与政党发展无关。结果是文献中出现了严重的空白。在这篇文章中，作者认为，总统制的制度激励政党组织起来，并采取不同于总统制的行为。作者探讨了1958年法国和1992年以色列从纯粹的总统制向半总统制转变对政党行为的影响。鉴于缺乏关于三权分立如何创造“总统化政党”的研究，这一论点建议学者重新思考政党在总统制和民主政体中的实际作用。
Scholars have devoted substantial research to political parties, but comparativists have not explored how presidentialism and parliamentarism differently affect party development, organization, and behavior. The parties' literature developed from explorations of European parliamentary systems, in which constitutional structure is not an independent variable, or from the U.S. case, in which the presidentialism is sometimes not related to party development. The result is a serious gap in the literature. In this article, the author argues that the institutions of presidentialism generate incentives for parties to organize and behave differently than they would otherwise under parliamentarism. The author explores the consequences for party behavior of a shift from pure parliamentarism to semipresidentialism in France in 1958 and Israel in 1992. Given the paucity of research on how the separation of powers creates “presidentialized parties,” the argument suggests scholars rethink parties' actual role in both within presidential systems as well as across democratic regime types