Detection games with a fully active attacker
Detection games with a fully active attacker
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完全活跃的攻击者的检测游戏
DOI：
10.1109/wifs.2015.7368575
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
N. Merhav
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Tondi;M. Barni;N. Merhav
我们分析了一个二元假设检验问题，在这个问题中，防御者必须决定测试序列是否已经从给定源P0中提取出来，而攻击者则努力阻止正确的检测。与前人的工作不同，本文提出的对抗性设置认为攻击者是完全主动的，即攻击者在这两个假设下都是主动的。具体地说，攻击者的目标是扭曲给定的序列，无论它是否从P0中出现，以迷惑防御者并诱导错误的决定。我们将防守与进攻的互动描述为一场游戏，并研究了两种不同的游戏版本，对应于两种不同的设置：Neyman-Pearson设置和贝叶斯设置。通过关注博弈的渐近版本，我们证明了存在一种既占主导地位(即无论防御策略是什么，都是最优的)和通用的(即独立于潜在来源)的攻击策略，并且我们推导出双方的均衡策略。
We analyze a binary hypothesis testing problem in which a defender has to decide whether or not a test sequence has been drawn from a given source P0 whereas, an attacker strives to impede the correct detection. In contrast to previous works, the adversarial setup addressed in this paper considers a fully active attacker, i.e. the attacker is active under both hypotheses. Specifically, the goal of the attacker is to distort the given sequence, no matter whether it has emerged from P0 or not, to confuse the defender and induce a wrong decision. We formulate the defender-attacker interaction as a game and study two versions of the game, corresponding to two different setups: a Neyman-Pearson setup and a Bayesian one. By focusing on asymptotic versions of the games, we show that there exists an attacking strategy that is both dominant (i.e., optimal no matter what the defence strategy is) and universal (i.e., independent of the underlying sources) and we derive equilibrium strategies for both parties.