A Game-Theoretic Approach to Achieving Bilateral Privacy-Utility Tradeoff in Spectrum Sharing
A Game-Theoretic Approach to Achieving Bilateral Privacy-Utility Tradeoff in Spectrum Sharing
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DOI：
10.1109/globecom42002.2020.9322123
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发表时间：
2020-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Mengmeng Liu;Xiangwei Zhou;Mingxuan Sun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Mengmeng Liu;Xiangwei Zhou;Mingxuan Sun
研究了数据库驱动的频谱共享系统中，主用户和次用户都可能遭受位置隐私泄露的隐私-效用权衡问题.为了保护双方的位置信息，双边隐私保护机制中引入的隐私保护水平进行量化。为了解决隐私级别越高，可共享的频谱越少，从而降低了双方的收益的问题，提出了一种基于Stackelberg模型的博弈论方法来实现隐私保护级别和用户效用之间的权衡.通过所提出的方法，PU和SU都可以通过将其位置隐私调整到期望的水平来最大化其效用。仿真结果表明，该方法可以有效地提高效用的PU和SU相比，具有固定的隐私级别的隐私保护机制。
In this paper, the problem of privacy-utility tradeoff in a database-driven spectrum sharing system is considered, where both primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs) may suffer from location privacy leakage. To protect the location information of both parties, a bilateral privacy preservation mechanism is introduced, in which the privacy-preserving levels are quantified. To tackle the dilemma that a higher privacy level leads to less available spectrum to share and thus reduces the profits of both parties, a game-theoretic approach based on the Stackelberg model is proposed to achieve the tradeoff between the privacy-preserving level and user utility. With the proposed approach, both PUs and SUs can maximize their utilities by adjusting their location privacy to desired levels. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed approach can effectively increase the utilities for both PUs and SUs in comparison with the privacy preservation mechanism with a fixed privacy level.