Is a 'free lunch' a good lunch? The performance of zero wholesale price-based supply-chain contracts
Is a 'free lunch' a good lunch? The performance of zero wholesale price-based supply-chain contracts
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2020.01.045
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发表时间：
2020-08-16
影响因子：
6.4
通讯作者：
Guo, Shu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Choi, Tsan-Ming;Guo, Shu
在现实世界中，一些制造商以零批发价(ZWP)向零售商供应产品，并通过分享收入或从零售商那里获得一些附带付款来获得补偿。本文对这种基于ZWP的供应链契约进行了分析。在基本模型中，订货是由制造商或零售商完成的。对于这两种情况，我们研究了ZWP-收入分享(ZR)合同、ZWP-Side-Payment(ZS)合同和ZWP-收入分享+Send-Payment(ZRS)合同。我们证明，无论订货场景是零售商主导还是制造商主导，只有ZRS合同才能实现双赢协调。在扩展模型中，我们首先研究了具有多个产品的场景，并讨论了广义ZRS合同如何有效地协调供应链。然后，我们研究了基于贪婪批发价(GWP)的合同，其中制造商向零售商收取等于零售价的批发价。我们发现，基于GWP的收入分享加支付方(GRS)合同和ZRS合同都可以实现双赢协调。然而，如果单位生产成本足够小，ZRS合同的均值-方差在给零售商和制造商带来较低水平的风险方面优于GRS合同。我们进一步讨论了ZWP合同与非ZWP合同在认知上的差异。重要的管理见解来自于这些发现。皇冠版权(C)2020由爱思唯尔B.V.出版。保留所有权利。
In the real world, some manufacturers supply their products to retailers at a zero wholesale price (ZWP), and receive compensation by sharing the revenue or receiving some side payment from the retailers. In this paper, we analyse this kind of ZWP-based supply-chain contract. In the basic model, ordering is done either by the manufacturer or the retailer. For both of these cases, we explore ZWP-revenue-sharing (ZR) contracts, ZWP-side-payment (ZS) contracts, and ZWP-revenue-sharing-plus-side-payment (ZRS) contracts. We prove that, irrespective of the ordering scenario being retailer-led or manufacturer-led, only a ZRS contract can achieve win-win coordination. In the extended models, we first study the scenario with multiple products and discuss how a generalised ZRS contract can coordinate the supply chain efficiently. We then investigate greedy wholesale price (GWP)-based contracts, in which the manufacturer charges the retailer a wholesale price equal to the retail price. We find that a GWP-based revenue-sharing-plusside-payment (GRS) contract and a ZRS contract can both achieve win-win coordination. However, the ZRS contract mean-variance dominates the GRS contract in bringing a lower level of risk to both the retailer and manufacturer if the unit production cost is sufficiently small. We further discuss cases of differences in the perception of ZWP versus non-ZWP contracts. Important managerial insights are derived from the findings. Crown Copyright (C) 2020 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.