Determinants and effects of the use of COVID-19 business support programs in Japan

Determinants and effects of the use of COVID-19 business support programs in Japan
复制标题

DOI:
10.1016/j.jjie.2022.101239
复制
发表时间:
2022-12-15
影响因子:
2.9
通讯作者:
Uesugi, Iichiro
Uesugi, Iichiro
中科院分区:
经济学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Honda, Tomohito;Hosono, Kaoru;Uesugi, Iichiro

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

本文利用对日本中小企业的调查和财务数据,分析了在新冠肺炎疫情期间,企业利用政府提供的企业支援计划的决定因素及其效果。关于决定因素,我们得到以下三个结果:第一,在疫情期间,销售额下降越多的企业,获得补贴贷款、赠款或补贴的可能性越大,这表明资金流向了受疫情影响的企业。其次,如果企业的信用评分较低或在疫情前被归类为“僵尸”和/或“低回报借款人”,则企业获得资金的可能性较高,这表明政府计划也帮助了疫情前表现不佳的企业。第三,如果企业以前与主要银行的关系更密切,那么它们更有可能获得资金,这表明银行关系在企业获得政府项目方面发挥着重要作用。关于因果效应,我们得到以下三个发现:第一,除了就业调整补贴,支持计划增加了用户企业的现金持有量。第二,来自私人金融机构的补贴贷款降低了退出率,而相对于非使用者(或绝对值),这些计划都没有对就业产生显著的积极影响。第三,使用支持计划的公司的信用评分和利润与销售额的比率下降,这些公司成为僵尸和/或低回报借款人的可能性增加。总的来说,我们的研究结果提供了一个警示故事,因为商业支持计划产生了好坏参半的结果,因为它们可能阻止了企业倒闭,但也有助于支撑那些从长远来看不可行的公司。
Using a survey of and financial data for Japanese small-and medium-enterprises (SMEs), this paper examines the determinants of firms' use of the business support programs provided by the Japanese government during the COVID-19 pandemic and their effect. With respect to the determinants, we obtain the following three findings: First, firms were more likely to have obtained subsidized loans, grants, or subsidies the more their sales had fallen during the pandemic, suggesting that funds flowed to firms that were adversely affected by the pandemic. Second, the likelihood that firms obtained funds was higher if their credit scores were lower or if they were classified as "zombies" and/or "low-return borrowers" before the pandemic, suggesting that the government programs also helped firms that had been under-performing before the pandemic. Third, firms were more likely to receive funds if they had a stronger relationship with their main bank before, suggesting that bank re-lationships play an important role in firms' access to government programs. Regarding the causal effects, we obtain the following three findings: First, except for the subsidies for employment adjustment, the support programs increased the cash holdings of user firms. Second, subsidized loans from private financial institutions lowered exit rates, while none of the programs had a significantly positive effect on employment relative to non-users (or in absolute terms). Third, the credit scores and profit-to-sales ratio of firms that used the support programs decreased and the likelihood of such firms being a zombie and/or a low-return borrower increased. Overall, our findings provide a cautionary tale in that the business support programs produced mixed results in that they may have prevented business failures but have also helped to prop up firms that are not viable in the long run.