Undermining cooperation: donor-patrons and the failure of political conditionality
Undermining cooperation: donor-patrons and the failure of political conditionality
复制标题
破坏合作：捐助者和政治条件的失败
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Nikolas G. Emmanuel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Nikolas G. Emmanuel
这项研究扩大了关于利用外国援助影响发展中国家政治改革的可行性的辩论。本研究采用定量与定性相结合的研究方法，力图在前人工作的基础上进行拓展。实证分析的结论指出，当捐助者之间存在密切合作时，政治条件是最有效的。然而，这种协调经常受到自私自利的捐助者赞助人的破坏，喀麦隆和法国的情况就是例证。这种模式是可以概括的，并严重破坏了政治条件方法的总体成功率。
This study extends the debate concerning the feasibility of using foreign assistance to leverage political reforms in developing countries. This research combines both quantitative and qualitative methodologies in an effort to expand on the work done by previous scholars. Conclusions of the empirical analysis point to the finding that political conditionality is most effective when close cooperation exists between donors. This coordination, however, is frequently sabotaged by self-interested donor-patrons, illustrated by the case of Cameroon and France. This pattern is generalizable and significantly undermines the overall success rate of a political conditionality approach.