ANONYMITY VERSUS PUNISHMENT IN ULTIMATUM BARGAINING
ANONYMITY VERSUS PUNISHMENT IN ULTIMATUM BARGAINING
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DOI：
10.1006/game.1995.1026
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发表时间：
1995-07-01
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
ZWICK, R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
BOLTON, GE;ZWICK, R
以前的研究表明，实验室发挥的最后通牒游戏不同于完美的均衡预测。匿名性假说将其归因于实验观察行为对主体目标的扭曲。另一种假说认为，这种现象是由于一些受试者愿意惩罚那些“不公平”对待他们的人，而不受任何实验者的影响。我们测试这些假设。在控制细胞中，30%的游戏处于平衡状态。在第二个细胞中，在强实验者-受试者匿名条件下进行游戏，46%的游戏处于均衡状态。在第三个细胞中，主体的惩罚能力被移除，表现出接近100%的平衡发挥。证据支持这样的结论，即惩罚假说比匿名假说更能解释完美均衡的偏离。(C)出版社：Academic Press
Previous investigations have shown that laboratory play of the ultimatum game differs from the perfect equilibrium prediction. The anonymity hypothesis attributes this to a distortion of subject objectives caused by the act of experimental observation. An alternative hypothesis attributes the phenomenon to the willingness of some subjects to punish those who treat them ''unfairly,'' independent of any experimenter influence. We test these hypotheses. In a control cell, 30% of play is in equilibrium. In a second cell, played under strong experimenter-subject anonymity conditions, 46% of play is in equilibrium. A third cell, in which subject capacity to punish has been removed, exhibits equilibrium play approaching 100%. The evidence supports the conclusion that the punishment hypothesis explains much more of the deviation from perfect equilibrium than does the anonymity hypothesis. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.