CEO retention, firm performance and corporate governance
CEO retention, firm performance and corporate governance
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CEO保留、公司绩效和公司治理
DOI：
10.1002/mde.4090110304
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发表时间：
1990
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kenneth K. T. Louie
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Fizel;Kenneth K. T. Louie
本文旨在确定CEO的更替是否是公司业绩的函数，因此试图衡量CEO的利益与股东利益的一致程度。本文的研究方法主要集中在估计CEO退出概率与公司绩效指标和公司治理结构之间的关系。本文的一个主要发现是，CEO对股东的责任受到CEO权力的显著限制，CEO离职更多地受到内部治理结构的影响，而不是公司利润或销售业绩。
This paper seeks to determine if CEO turnover is a function of firm performance, and therefore attempts to gauge the extent to which CEO interests are aligned with those of stockholders. The methodology in this paper focuses primarily on estimating the relationship between the probability of CEO exit and indices of firm performance and corporate governance structure. A major finding of the paper is that the accountability of CEOs to stockholders is significantly limited by CEO power, and CEO turnover is influenced more by internal governance structure than by firm profit or sales performance.