Altruism, Rivalry and Crowding-Out in the Nonprofit Firm's Supply of Charity Services: the Case of Hospitals
Altruism, Rivalry and Crowding-Out in the Nonprofit Firm's Supply of Charity Services: the Case of Hospitals
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非营利公司提供慈善服务中的利他主义、竞争和挤出：以医院为例
DOI：
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发表时间：
1988
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Salkever
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Frank;D. Salkever
本文将之前关于个人慈善捐赠供给的研究延伸到非营利公司的行为。具体来说，我们研究私立非营利医院提供的慈善医疗服务。我们证明，在慈善医疗供应没有产生巨大的积极收入影响的情况下，对非营利医院的凸偏好意味着受到其他私立或政府医院的排挤。将我们的模型扩展到包括患者异质性和不纯粹的利他主义（竞争），为之前报道的实证结果提供了可能的解释，即挤出和收入对贫困护理供应的影响通常很弱或微不足道。对马里兰州医院数据的实证分析提供了强有力的证据，证明门诊和住院慈善护理的供应存在竞争，但当分析仅限于住院护理时则不然。
This paper extends previous research on Individuals' supply of charitable donations to the behavior of nonprofit firms. Specifically, we study provision of charity care by private, nonprofit hospitals. We demonstrate that In the absence of large positive income effects on charity care supply, convex preferences for the nonprofit hospital imply crowding out by other private or government hospitals. Extending our model to include patient heterogeneity and impure altruism (rivalry) provides a possible explanation for the previously reported empirical result that both crowding out and income effects on indigent care supply are often weak or insignificant. Empirical analysis of data for hospitals in Maryland provides strong evidence of rivalry on the supply of outpatient plus inpatient charity care, but not when the analysis is confined to inpatient care.