Optimal fiscal limits with overrides
Optimal fiscal limits with overrides
复制标题
具有优先权的最佳财政限额
DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.04.001
复制
发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Ross T. Milton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Stephen Coate;Ross T. Milton
本文研究了简单政治经济模型背景下的最优财政限制。政治家为有代表性的公民选择税收水平，但偏向于提高税收。宪法设计者在完全了解公民偏好的税收水平之前设定税收限额。经公民批准，政客可以超越限制。本文求解了最佳限制，并解释了覆盖可能性如何影响它。该论文还表明，如果设计者对政客的否决提案施加限制，公民的福利就可以得到提高。
This paper studies optimal fiscal limits in the context of a simple political economy model. A politician chooses the level of taxation for a representative citizen but is biased in favor of higher taxes. A constitutional designer sets a tax limit before the citizen's preferred level of taxation is fully known. The politician is allowed to override the limit with the citizen's approval. The paper solves for the optimal limit and explains how it is impacted by the possibility of overrides. The paper also shows that the citizen's welfare can be enhanced if the designer imposes a limit on the politician's override proposals.