Evolutionary dynamics, intrinsic noise, and cycles of cooperation
Evolutionary dynamics, intrinsic noise, and cycles of cooperation
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DOI：
10.1103/physreve.81.066122
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发表时间：
2010-06-28
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
McKane, Alan J.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bladon, Alex J.;Galla, Tobias;McKane, Alan J.
我们使用基于逆系统规模展开的分析技术来研究在重复囚徒困境博弈中相互作用的有限参与者群体的随机演化动力学。我们证明了人口噪声放大的机制可以在参数区域引起相干振荡，其中确定性描述收敛到具有复特征值的不动点。这些介于合作和叛逃之间的准周期以前已经在计算机模拟中被观察到；在这里，我们对它们的性质提供了系统和全面的分析表征。我们能够预测它们的功率谱作为突变率和其他模型参数的函数，并比较不同类型的潜在微观动力学诱导的循环的相对幅度。我们还将我们的分析扩展到重复的囚犯困境游戏，使用了一种赢-留-输-移策略，适用于玩家容易犯颤抖手类型错误的情况。
We use analytical techniques based on an expansion in the inverse system size to study the stochastic evolutionary dynamics of finite populations of players interacting in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We show that a mechanism of amplification of demographic noise can give rise to coherent oscillations in parameter regimes where deterministic descriptions converge to fixed points with complex eigenvalues. These quasicycles between cooperation and defection have previously been observed in computer simulations; here we provide a systematic and comprehensive analytical characterization of their properties. We are able to predict their power spectra as a function of the mutation rate and other model parameters and to compare the relative magnitude of the cycles induced by different types of underlying microscopic dynamics. We also extend our analysis to the iterated prisoner's dilemma game with a win-stay lose-shift strategy, appropriate in situations where players are subject to errors of the trembling-hand type.