A simple sufficient condition for a unique and student-efficient stable matching in the college admissions problem
A simple sufficient condition for a unique and student-efficient stable matching in the college admissions problem
复制标题
大学招生问题中独特且学生有效的稳定匹配的简单充分条件
DOI：
10.1007/s40505-020-00197-2
复制
发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
0.3
通讯作者：
Reny, Philip J.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Reny, Philip J.
想想大学录取问题。假设（学生和大学）的偏好是以学生为导向的，即当两个学生对两所大学的排名不一致时，这两个学生中的每一个都比另一个学生更喜欢他所喜欢的大学。我们表明，当偏好定向时，存在唯一的稳定匹配，并且没有其他匹配，稳定与否，每个学生都弱偏好。
Consider the college admissions problem. Let us say that (student and college) preferences are student-oriented iff whenever two students disagree about the ranking of two colleges, each one of the two students is ranked higher by the college he prefers than the other student. We show that when preferences are oriented there is a unique stable matching, and that no other matching, stable or not, is weakly preferred by every student.