Neurolaw: the big question.
Neurolaw: the big question.
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Neurolaw：大问题。
DOI：
10.1080/15265160701828485
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Wolf,SusanM
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文献类型：
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作者：
Wolf,SusanM
随着神经伦理学的出现，神经法应运而生。这个新词涵盖了越来越多的神经科学可能被证明相关的法律领域。由于民法和刑法与人类的意图、心理状态、能力、罪责和责任息息相关，因此法律和神经科学之间可能存在着大量的联系。Meegan教授专注于记忆检测的神经成像技术(Meegan 2008)，但Tovino列举了更长的清单(Tovino 2007)。她的清单涉及不动产规则、知识产权原则、身体和精神痛苦的侵权法评估、隐私和保密的卫生法保护、就业和残疾人法、青少年的刑事责任、刑事定罪和精神错乱索赔。那是在你谈到宪法之前，宪法第一修正案对言论自由的限制，第四修正案对搜查和扣押的限制，以及第五修正案对自证其罪的特权都表明神经科学应该发挥作用。事实上，关于脑科学对法律的影响的工作大大早于神经法这一术语。一篇庞大的文献讨论了自由意志和人类责任的概念是否受到脑科学的威胁，脑科学和心理科学是否允许预测暴力和累犯，以及大脑病理应该如何影响民事和刑事责任的调查结果。这份迅速增长的法律/神经科学交叉清单可能会让神经法陷入与医保法相同的命运。卫生法评论员抱怨说，这个领域什么都有，因此什么都不是(Elhauge，1994)。如果医保法涵盖从医患关系和知情同意到欺诈和虐待、就业法、税法和残疾人法的所有内容，就很难看出该领域的独特之处，它构成了什么核心挑战，以及如何系统化我们对该领域的思考以取得进展。同样，神经法似乎越来越涉及一切--从神经成像设备的测试和营销，到神经成像设备的隐私和保密：本文源于神经成像方面的工作，作为美国国立卫生研究院(NIH)的一部分，国家人类基因组研究所授予编号1-R01-HG003178-02(Susan M.Wolf，JD，首席研究员)“管理人类受试者研究中的偶然发现”，并参与由麦克阿瑟基金会(Michael Gazzaniga，Ph.，首席研究员)资助的法律和神经科学项目。本文所持立场既不代表美国国立卫生研究院的观点，也不代表麦克阿瑟基金会的观点。我感谢法律和神经科学项目大脑减少网络的其他成员，他们对我们2007年秋季会议上提交的早期版本提供了反馈。感谢彼得·科尔赫普的研究协助。地址：苏珊·沃尔夫，明尼苏达大学法学院，第19大道229号。那么，明尼阿波利斯，明尼苏达州55455。电子邮件：swolf@umn。EDU神经科学诊断、原告和被告声称的单个肿瘤和神经病理、声称的疼痛评估，以及记忆检测的法医使用，一直到人类头骨内的国家监视的极限，以及选择和意图的法律概念的持续可行性。我们正在迅速地失去森林而失去树木。迷失在一堆引人入胜的个人问题中，我们就会忘记最大的问题--法律应该如何应对和整合这种科学。我们已经忘记了这个基本问题的迹象是显而易见的。在回应法律/神经科学问题的刺耳声音时，我们看到了一些…
With the emergence of neuroethics has come neurolaw. This neologism covers a growing list of legal domains in which neuroscience may prove relevant. Because civil and criminal law has everything to do with human intentions, states of mind, competence, culpability, and responsibility, the points of possible connection between law and neuroscience are legion. Professor Meegan focuses on neuroimaging techniques for memory detection (Meegan 2008), but Tovino has enumerated a longer list (Tovino 2007). Her list ranges over real property rules, intellectual property doctrine, tort law evaluation of physical and emotional pain, health law protection of privacy and confidentiality, employment and disability law, criminal responsibility of juveniles, establishment of criminal mens rea, and insanity claims. And that is before you get to constitutional law, where First Amendment freedom of speech, Fourth Amendment restraints on search and seizure, and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination all suggest a role for neuroscience. Indeed, work on the implications of brain sciences for law substantially predates the term neurolaw. A hefty literature has debated whether notions of free will and human responsibility are threatened by brain sciences, whether brain and psychological sciences permit predictions of violence and recidivism, and how brain pathology should affect findings of civil and criminal responsibility. This burgeoning list of law/neuroscience intersections threatens to doom neurolaw to the same fate as health law. Health law commentators have complained that the field is about everything and thus, nothing (Elhauge 1994). If health law covers everything from physician–patient relationships and informed consent to fraud and abuse, employment law, tax law, and disability law, it becomes difficult to see what is distinctive about the field, what core challenges it poses, and how to systematize our thinking about the field to make progress. Similarly, neurolaw seems increasingly about everything—from the testing and marketing of neuroimaging devices, the privacy and confidentiality ofAcknowledgement: This article grew out of work on neuroimaging as part of National Institutes of Health (NIH), National Human Genome Research Institute grant no. 1-R01-HG003178-02 (Susan M. Wolf, JD, Principal Investigator) on “Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research” and participation in the Law & Neuroscience Project funded by the MacArthur Foundation (Michael Gazzaniga, Ph. D., Principal Investigator). The positions taken in this article reflect neither the views of NIH nor those of the MacArthur Foundation. I am indebted to the other members of the Law & Neuroscience Project’s Network on Diminished Brains for their feedback on an earlier version presented at our Fall 2007 meeting. Thanks to Peter Kohlhepp for research assistance. Address correspondence to Susan Wolf, University of Minnesota Law School, 229 19th Ave. So., Minneapolis, MN 55455. E-mail: swolf@ umn. edu neuroscientific diagnoses, the individual tumors and neuropathologies claimed by plaintiffs and defendants, the assessment of claimed pain, and the forensic use of memory detection, all the way to the limits of state surveillance inside the human skull and continued viability of legal concepts of choice and intent. We are fast losing the forest for the trees. And lost in a welter of fascinating individual issues, we will lose track of the biggest issue—how law should cope with and integrate this kind of science. The signs that we have lost track of that foundational question are apparent. In response to the cacophony of law/neuroscience issues, we see some …