Instabile Finanzmärkte
Instabile Finanzmärkte
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金融市场不稳定
DOI：
10.1111/1468-2516.0313
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Krahnen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Franke;J. Krahnen
长期以来受到尊重的金融市场自我稳定、平衡的范式受到最近金融危机的严重挑战。尽管有复杂的银行风险管理和全面的银行监管，银行间和公司债券市场在2007-2009年崩溃。拯救银行所需要的国家干预在现代经济史上是没有先例的。在本文中，我们试图解释金融市场的不稳定性。我们认为，危机的关键决定因素是信息结构的弱点，而信息结构应向投资者提供可靠的信息。不稳定性的三个决定因素是：第一，债务工具的使用加上公司的高度杠杆;第二，证券的可交易性加上承担风险的增加;第三，金融产品和网络的复杂程度增加，加上银行的资产和风险结构更加同质化。这些决定因素加强了金融系统的脆弱性和信息结构的作用。我们讨论了有意义的监管改革的几个要求，忽略了激励问题（在Franke/Krahnen 2009中讨论），即可靠的信息提供、宏观审慎监管、稳健的资本标准以及衍生品市场风险聚集的限制。
The paradigm of self-stabilizing, equilibrating financial markets, respected for a long time, is seriously challenged by the recent financial crisis. Despite sophisticated bank risk management and comprehensive bank supervision interbank and corporate bond markets collapsed in 2007-2009. The state interventions required for saving banks are without precedent in modern economic history. In this essay we attempt to explain financial market instability. Key determinants of the crisis are, in our opinion, weaknesses of the information architecture which should provide credible information for investors. Three determinants of instability are identified: first, the utilization of debt instruments combined with high degrees of corporate leverage; second, the tradeability of securities combined with increased risk taking; and third, the increased degree of complexity of financial products and networks, combined with more homogeneous asset and risk structures of banks. These determinants strengthen financial system vulnerability and the role of the information architecture. We discuss several requirements for a meaningful regulatory reform, leaving out incentive issues (which are treated in Franke/Krahnen 2009), namely credible provision of information, macro-prudential supervision, robust capital standards, as well as a limitation of risk clustering in derivative markets.