An Application of the Shapley Value to Fair Division with Money
An Application of the Shapley Value to Fair Division with Money
复制标题
Shapley值在货币公平除法中的应用
作者：
H. Moulin
在货币补偿可行且效用为拟线性的条件下，考虑了公平分配问题。四个公理进行了讨论：个人理性，资源单调性，人口团结，和独立的测试。后者将消费所有商品的效用视为每个联盟实际（联合）效用的上限。在效率下，这四个公理几乎没有兼容性。然而，当商品在每个人的偏好中具有足够的可替代性时，剩余分享博弈的Shapley值满足所有四个公理。一个例子是当每个代理人只消费一种商品时，不可分割商品的最优分配。版权所有1992年由计量经济学会。
The author considers fair division when monetary compensations are feasible and utilities are quasi-linear. Four axioms are discussed: individual rationality, resource monotonicity, population solidarity, and the stand alone test. The latter views the utility from consuming all the goods as an upper bound on every coalition's actual (joint) utility. Under efficiency, the four axioms show little compatibility. However, when the goods have enough substitutability in everyone's preferences, the Shapley value of the surplus sharing game satisfies all four axioms. An example is the optimal assignment of indivisible goods when every agent consumes only one good. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.