A Formula Goes to Court : Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap

A Formula Goes to Court : Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap
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公式告上法庭:党派选区划分与效率差距

DOI:
10.1029/2006wr004954
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发表时间:
2017
影响因子:
5.4
通讯作者:
Daniel Smith
Daniel Smith
中科院分区:
地球科学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Daniel Smith

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