Non-Linear Pricing Competition with Private Capacity Information
Non-Linear Pricing Competition with Private Capacity Information
复制标题
私人容量信息的非线性定价竞争
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
G. Perakis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hamid Nazerzadeh;G. Perakis
我们研究了一种常见的代理模型，其知情主体由两个能力有限的供应商和一个零售商组成。每个供应商的产能都是她的私人信息。供应商根据其能力，同时且非合作地向零售商提供数量-价格表。然后，零售商决定从每个供应商处购买的数量，以最大化自己的效用。我们证明该博弈存在（纯策略）纳什均衡。我们表明，在均衡状态下，每个（无穷小）供给单位都被分配了一个边际价格，该价格与产能无关，仅取决于零售商的估值函数和产能的分布。此外，产能较大的供应商会出售其所有供应量。
We study a common agency model with informed principals consisting of two capacity-constrained suppliers and a single retailer. The capacity of each supplier is her private information. Conditioned on their capacities, the suppliers simultaneously and non-cooperatively offer quantity-price schedules to the retailer. Then, the retailer decides on the quantities to purchase from each supplier in order to maximize his own utility. We prove the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium for this game. We show that at the equilibrium each (infinitesimal) unit of the supply is assigned a marginal price which is independent of the capacities and depends only on the valuation function of the retailer and the distribution of the capacities. In addition, the supplier with the larger capacity sells all her supply.